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MIKLÓS KENGYEL ∗ 
 
Recent Developments in Hungarian Civil Procedure 
 
 
1. Introduction 
  
The Code of Civil Procedure of 1911 was one of the greatest achievements of 
Hungarian codification in the 20th century. The value of this statement is not 
diminished by the fact that our procedure had German and Austrian roots. 
Sándor Plósz, the creator of this field of law drew on the German and Austrian 
codes with a very fortunate and steady hand. The first Code of Civil Procedure 
of the 20th century was in force from 1915 to 1952, and during this period it 
had to be modified only once, namely in the early 1930s when the wave of 
bankruptcies following the economic crisis necessitated the acceleration of 
civil actions. 
 The second model of our civil procedure in the 20th century, the Code of 
Civil Procedure of 1952 in its original form intended to imitate the Soviet-
Russian Code of 1923. For this reason among others, the institution of “people’s” 
assessors and the participation of public prosecutors were introduced, the 
obligatory representation by lawyers had been eliminated, the first instance 
procedures were unified, the review appeals were discontinued and a one-level 
legal remedy system had been developed with the possibility of protest on legal 
grounds. 
 The Code of Civil Procedure contained many “socialist” elements: The most 
important one was the change in the principle of party control. The law divided 
control over the scope and nature of the proceedings between the parties, the 
court, and the public prosecutor. As a result of this, the conventional right of 
disposal became illusory in practice because all the procedural acts of the 
parties felt under the control of the court and the public prosecutor. 
 Contrary to the principle of party control’s socialist transcript, the principle 
of adversary hearing had not been implemented in a completely socialist way 
in Hungarian civil procedure. The socialist idea on civil procedure, in which it 
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is the parties’ duty to disclose all relevant facts and the power of the court to 
take the initiative ex officio in discovering the true facts of the case is mixed 
up with the spirit of the Code of Plósz. As a result of this, Hungarian civil 
procedure had been protected even in the 1950s from the application of the 
principle of judicial investigation.  
 The Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure of 1952 was characterised by the 
active role of the judiciary as initiator, which contained the formal conduct of 
proceedings and made the judge’s duty to clarify the facts. As a result of the ex 
officio automatism characterising each phase of the process, the parties were 
left little freedom of disposition over the course of the proceedings. The summon-
ing, the service of process, the deadline fixing, and trial dates took place ex 
officio; the party was allowed to request the extension of the deadline only. 
The preparation for the trial and the conduct of the trial, the most important 
element of the conduct of proceedings, also formed part of the tasks of the court. 
 The four decades of socialist civil procedure cannot be defined as a uniform 
period: In Hungary at the beginning of the 1970s, the situation was suitable for 
reducing the dominance of the judge and the public prosecutor. The third 
amendment to the Code on Civil Procedure (Act XXVI of 1972) restricted the 
possibility of the initiation of a court action or intervention by public prose-
cutors. It also took steps to increase the weight and responsibility of the parties 
in the legal action, for the sake of improving the efficiency of the procedure. 
 Subsequent modifications of the socialist Code of Civil Procedure could 
not repeat the success of the third amendment to the Code. Between 1973 and 
1979 hardly any provisions of law were made concerning civil procedure. The 
reasons for the decade’s last relevant modification were not procedural but 
organizational ones. 
 In the second half of the 1980s, one more unsuccessful attempt at codifica-
tion was made. The most important goal of this was the further simplification 
and acceleration of procedures. The concept of 1988 did not want to change 
relationship between the court and the parties, and it did not plan to renew the 
content of the socialist principles of disposition and hearing. The last socialist 
concept silently passed away in the whirl of the political transformation. 
 
 
2. Renewal of Hungarian Civil Procedure after the Democratic 
Transformation 
 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court played a determining role in the re-
establishment of rule of law. One of the most significant decisions of the 
Constitutional Court relating to civil procedure was Dec. 9/1992 (I. 30) AB, 
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in which the institution of protest on legal grounds were declared unconstitu-
tional and the rules were annulled. It was laid down as a fact that a protest on 
legal grounds was contrary to the rule of law, to the institution of legal force, 
and to the parties’ right of control over their disputes. 
 The first amendment after the democratic transformation had as one of its 
primary purposes to substitute the protest on legal grounds annulled by the 
Constitutional Court and rules that were outdated or contrary to international 
conventions. The first amendment after the democratic transformation–in spite 
of the preliminary expectations–did not re-establish the remedy at (the?) third 
instance, which was abolished in 1951. This caused disappointment among the 
judiciary and in legal literature. 
 In the mid 1990’s, the judicial government took the first steps for a further 
modification. The direct cause of this act was the considerable protraction of 
civil actions which already queried the functionality of jurisdiction. The 
acceleration of the procedure became the most important intention of the 
legislature. The new modification was aimed to change relations between the 
court and the parties in some important questions. 
 One of the greatest achievements of the 1995 reform amendment was the 
reformulation of the principle of party control. After the collapse of socialism, 
the principle of party control (which had embodied the ideology of the system) 
also became meaningless since private property, market economy, and constitu-
tionality all required respect for private autonomy. Five years had to pass 
after the democratic transformation for the genuine content of the principle of 
disposition to be re-established on the basis of the decisions of the Consti-
tutional Court and later on the basis of the 1995 modification of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. 
 The 1995 amendment, in accordance with Dec. 1/1994 (I. 7) AB, has 
maintained the general entitlement of the prosecutor to commence actions in 
cases where the entitled parties are unable to protect their rights for any reason. 
According to the point of view of the Constitutional Court, this restriction on the 
constitutional right of autonomy is an unavoidable restriction and corresponds 
Art. 51(3) of the Constitution; according to which, protecting and ensuring the 
constitutional public order, rights, and legal interests of citizens (and their 
organizations) is also the task of the public prosecutor’s office. 
 The 1995 amendment set the principle of adversary hearing on a new basis. 
According to the new rule, the court may order the taking of evidence ex officio 
only when the law allows it, whereupon the proving of the facts required to 
decide the action is solely the task of the parties. The modification of art. 
164(2) drastically restricted the possibility of ordering evidence officially to 
the number of cases defined by the Act, by which it wanted to ensure the 
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absolute effectiveness of the adversary hearing. By this solution, the legislature 
did not return to the moderate regulation (the principle of mixed adversary 
hearing) applied by the Code of Civil Procedure of 1911, but to the model 
applied by liberal civil procedure in the 19th century. Apart from the fact that 
the pure principle of adversary hearing does not have historical roots in Central 
Europe, the 1995 amendment also proved to be inconsistent as it maintained 
the court’s obligation to endeavour to find out the truth stated in art. 3(1). 
 
 
3. The Influence of Hungarian Judicial Reform on the Code of Civil 
Procedure 
 
The large judicial reform scheduled for the end of the 1990s, made it necessary 
to modify the Code of Civil Procedure. The most important provisions of 
Act LXXII of 1997 did not come into force immediately because of the delay 
in the setting-up of the regional courts of appeals. In spite of this, the 1997 
amendment is considered to be significant regulation because, by the intro-
duction of the idea of disputes involving a small amount (less than HUF 
200 000), it simplified both appeals and reviews, it restricted the possibility 
of appeals in administrative proceedings, and re-regulated labour disputes (arts 
349–359). 
 The reform of the judicial organization, which broke down in 1998, was 
given a fresh start by Act CX of 1999. This amendment practically finished 
the change of model started at the beginning of the 1990s, re-formulated the 
principles of civil proceedings, and the purpose of the action. Forty seven 
years after the Code of Civil Procedure came into force, the legislature gave up 
the aim of ensuring the decision of civil legal disputes on the basis of truth. At 
the same time it released the court from the obligation to endeavour to find out 
the truth in civil actions. The new objective that replaced the just resolution of 
legal disputes, in harmony with the requirement of a fair trial laid down by Art. 
6 of the ECHR, wishes to guarantee the impartial decision of legal disputes. 
The guarantee of this is the fact that the court has to proceed in accordance 
with the re-formulated principles of civil procedure. 
 Among the significant innovations, it should be mentioned that the 1999 
amendment fixed numerous deadlines binding on all courts. For example art. 
125(1) prescribed that the court has to take steps to fix a date for the hearing 
not later than within 30 days after the statement of claim is received by the 
court, and according to art. 125(3) the date of hearing shall be fixed in such a 
way that it could be held in four months. 
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4. In search of the ‘Lost Truth’ 
 
The 1999 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure produced little reaction in 
legal literature even though the elimination of the concept of truth from arts. 1 
and 3 of the Code was one of the most important modifications since the coming 
into force of the Code. This step of the legislature was not unexpected, how-
ever, since the 1995 amendment restricting the possibility of ordering evidence 
officially anticipated the change strengthening the role of proof. (The apathy of 
the judiciary may be explained by the frequent modifications, since the time of 
the democratic transformation, that did not concern civil procedure only.) 
 The former judge István Novák was the first one who came to the conclu-
sion that our civil procedure will surely resist to the shock caused by the lack 
of truth. 
 Tamás Földesi defended the ‘lost truth’. There is a close connection between 
truth and justice, which can be expressed in a simplified way by the fact that a just 
judgement can generally be based on true statements, proved facts, or facts at least 
verified with a high probability. Földesi suggested reinstating provisions 
concerning truth in the course of further modifications of civil procedure. 
 As for ourselves, we do not oppose the declarative re-appearance of the 
concept of truth in civil procedure, and so it is expected by the majority of the 
judiciary and by the public seeking justice. We share the view of the great 
Austrian jurist, Franz Klein that legal action without truth is a ‘rattling mill 
running with no loads’. However, we consider it more important that a future 
new Code of Civil Procedure should define the objective of proof more 
specifically than the present one. 
 
 
5. ‘Dimming’ of the Role of the Judge 
 
Another substantial part of the change of model ,between 1995 und 2000 was 
the dimming of the role of the Judge. 
 The 1999 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure put even more emphasis 
on the principle of disposition by the re-formulation of the fundamental 
principles of the Code, by the modification of the existing provisions, and by 
the establishment of new rules. The modified art. 3(1) lays down the exclusive 
right of the party interested in the dispute to institute legal proceedings, which 
right can only be restricted by law. Article 3(2) declares that the court, unless 
provision is made to the contrary, is bound by the petitions and declarations 
submitted by the parties, and extends the application of the principle of 
disposition to the parties’ control over the whole proceeding. Thus, the Code 
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makes it clear now that the parties are the ‘masters of the case’, they determine 
the subject-matter of the proceedings and so the procedural scope of action of 
the court. At the same time, the court is bound to prevent any procedural action 
of the parties and their representatives which is contrary to the requirement of 
good faith in the exercise of rights (art. 8). As a consequence, the parties’ right 
to disposition is not unlimited; it may only prevail within the framework of 
another principle: The exercise of rights in good faith. 
 Everybody agreed that the judge had to be relieved from unnecessary 
burdens, so the ‘hyperactivity’ of the socialist era had to be changed with a 
different role for judges. The modifications between 1995 and 1999 seemed to 
find this new role in the contemplative judge. In conformity with this, 
supplying facts in proceedings became solely the task of the parties and the 
modification did not allow the ordering of proof officially–contrary e.g. to the 
1911 Code of Civil Procedure–not even for practical purposes, because it 
would restrict the right of the parties to self-determination. 
 It should be noted that the reduction of judicial power took place in the 
former socialist countries at a time when: In the common law legal system, the 
idea of judicial “case management” had evolved, which–by contrast–endeav-
oured to move judges out of their traditional passive roles (e.g. Civil Justice 
Act of 1990). This phenomenon may rightly be characterised as the convergence 
of procedural models from both directions. Development is aimed to balance 
judicial power and modern cooperation between the parties and the court. 
 Seeing this procedure, we can observe this third change of the model of 
our civil procedure within a century with some anxiety. In the mid 1950s, 
mechanical and uncritical acceptance of Soviet legal institutions replaced the 
German-Austrian orientation of values. Nowadays we are approaching a–partly-
outdated–English-American model of civil procedure. Even besides the 
fulfilment of duties of legal harmonization, enough ground is left for the Code 
of Civil Procedure, which should be filled with legal institution based on 
Hungarian procedural traditions rather than with the development of a newer 
model of litigation. The judge’s role in civil litigation does not have to be re-
invented since it was defined precisely by Géza Magyary nearly a century ago: 
‘It must be up to the parties whether they want legal defence or not but it must 
not depend on them how the proceedings are conducted or how long they last’. 
 At the end of my presentation I would like to give a brief summary of the 
actual state of Hungarian Civil Procedure Law. 
 There had been no significant amendments since 1999. The attempt to 
reform the regulation of the review appeal of 2002 has failed. The judicial 
government issues, each year, new proposals which are regularly refused by 
the legal practice and literature. The economic crisis that Hungary is facing 
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now is not favourable for the reform either. Due to lack of funds, the recently 
adopted law on legal aid cannot be applied yet. The introduction of electronic 
proceedings are hindered by the insufficient equipment of the courts. We can 
only hope that after the reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, a new Civil 
Procedure Code will finally be on agenda. 
 
 
